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ABSTRACT
Objective To determine what components of a checklist
contribute to effective detection of medication errors at
the bedside.
Design High-ﬁdelity simulation study of outpatient
chemotherapy administration.
Setting Usability laboratory.
Participants Nurses from an outpatient chemotherapy
unit, who used two different checklists to identify four
categories of medication administration errors.
Main outcome measures Rates of speciﬁed types of
errors related to medication administration.
Results As few as 0% and as many as 90% of each type
of error were detected. Error detection varied as
a function of error type and checklist used. Speciﬁc step-
by-step instructions were more effective than abstract
general reminders in helping nurses to detect errors.
Adding a speciﬁc instruction to check the patient’s
identiﬁcation improved error detection in this category by
65 percentage points. Matching the sequence of items
on the checklist with nurses’ workﬂow had a positive
impact on the ease of use and efﬁciency of the checklist.
Conclusions Checklists designed with explicit step-by-
step instructions are useful for detecting speciﬁc errors
when a care provider is required to perform a long series
of mechanistic tasks under a high cognitive load. Further
research is needed to determine how best to assist
clinicians in switching between mechanistic tasks and
abstract clinical problem solving.
INTRODUCTION
Adverse drug events have long been established as
a signiﬁcant cause of patient harm,
1e4 and severe
incidents with intravenous drug administration
have been well documented.
5e8 Thus, for certain
medications, safety groups are increasingly recom-
mending the use of independent double checks for
detecting errors.
9e11
Independent double checking is a process
involving two individuals, in which the responsi-
bility of the second individual is to verify the work
performed by the ﬁrst.
12 The word ‘independent’
refers to having a second person follow a series of
steps to arrive at a calculation or setting; those
steps are performed with no prior knowledge of any
previous calculation or setting. This approach is
thought to reduce the possibility of ‘conﬁrmation
bias,’ which occurs when the person checking the
medication is likely to see what they expect to see,
even if an error has occurred.
13
Although recommendations for carrying out
independent double checks are common,
9e11 little
research has been done on this practice. One
frequently cited study established an error detection
rate of 93e97%
14 but did not include details of how
the checks were performed. However, safety orga-
nisations have made speciﬁc recommendations
about how double checks should be performed. For
example, some have recommended the second
clinician have no knowledge of the calculation or
settingbeforeconductingtheveriﬁcation.
91 5Others
have recommended the use of a checklist and
a formalised process,
12 but no examples or speciﬁc
design recommendations have been provided. As
such, it is not clear what elements of a double check
yield the highest success in detecting errors.
Our hospital’s outpatient chemotherapy unit
recently introduced a new double checking process
and checklist for the veriﬁcation of ambulatory
infusion pump (AIP) settings. Many studies have
shown the effectiveness of checklists in improving
patient safety,
16e18 but a recent review found very
little research on the effective design of checklists.
19
In the study reported here, we used an experi-
mental approach to examine what components of
a double check contributed to effective detection of
medication errors with the aim of generating
evidence-based recommendations for designing sup-
portive tools. Given the opportunity for study in our
hospital and the risks associated with chemo-
therapy administration,
20 the clinical model for this
research was chemotherapy.
METHODS
It was essential to begin this research with a solid
understanding of the context in which error
checking takes place, as well as the speciﬁc risks
associatedwithadministeringchemotherapybyAIP.
Hence,usingtheapproachofcontextualenquiry,
21 22
we observed 13 registered nurses in the unit for30 h.
We then identiﬁed all failures that could occur and
classiﬁed these into four categories (table 1).
23
CHECKLIST DESIGNS
Twochecklistswerecomparedinthisstudy.Onehad
been in use in the unit for several months. The new
checklist was a revision of the old checklist and was
based on our observations of how it was being used.
Old checklist
This checklist had been designed to ensure that the
second nurse had no knowledge of the medication
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Error managementorder before viewing the pump settings,
9 15 and was meant to be
conducted as follows (ﬁgure 1):
The ﬁrst nurse checks the ‘ﬁve rights’ between the order
and the drug label, and programmes the pump according to the
label.
The second nurse copies all values directly from the pump
screen to the checklist, and then veriﬁes the checklist against the
label.
The second nurse checks the drug label against the order to
ensure the drug has been prepared as prescribed.
The second nurse returns the pump and the checklist to the ﬁrst
nurse, who checks the label against the patient’s armband and
administers the medication to the patient.
During observations, we noticed the checklist was not
routinely used as intended. Speciﬁcally, the second nurse tended
to look cyclically at the label, order and pump for each item and
then write its value onto the checklist. This approach meant
that the nurse had knowledge of what to expect on the pump
screens before looking at the pump, hence compromising the
independence of the check.
We believed the reason for this behaviour was the placement
of the items ‘total dose’ and ‘infusion duration’ at the beginning
of the list. This information was only available on the drug label
and order, not the pump. Thus, to complete the checklist from
top to bottom, nurses had to look ﬁrst at the order or label.
We also observed that despite instructions at the top of the
form to check the label to the patient’s armband, nurses did not
routinely check patient identity.
New checklist
Based on our observations, we reﬁned the checklist (ﬁgure 2). To
address the issue of the independence, the checklist was rear-
ranged so that the ﬁrst six items of the checklist mirrored the
exact sequence of the infusion pump prompts.
To address the potential for administering a medication to the
wrong patient, we embedded a speciﬁc item into the checklist,
reminding the nurse to check the patient’s identity from the
armband against the drug label.
We were concerned that clinical decision errors would be
missed with the existing checklist, since there were no reminders
to check for this error type. We thus added a reminder of the ‘ﬁve
rights’ of medication administration, along with a graphic
stating ‘STOP! Knowing all you know, does this order make
sense to you?’
PROCEDURE
To compare the two checklists, we simulated error checking for
intravenous chemotherapy in a usability laboratory with one-
way mirrors and cameras (ﬁgure 3). Ten nurses from the unit
were recruited to participate. Furniture, patient charts, inter-
ruptions and ambient noise were used to replicate their clinical
environment and tasks.
A nurse actor programmed the pumps and created a realistic
teamwork environment, two actors played the roles of patients
with cancer, and a mannequin was used as an additional patient
(ﬁgure 4).
The focus of the experiment was on the second nurse’s ability
to detect errors using the checklists. They had to care for their
own patients and check the other nurse’s pumps. To create
a sense of realism, they were regularly interrupted by the actors’
unscripted conversations.
Each participant used the old and new checklists: half used
the old checklist ﬁrst. In total, each participant checked 14
pumps (seven with each double checking method) (table 2).
Errors were also counterbalanced between participants and
carefully matched between the two checklists.
Two observers collected data on the number and type of errors
detected and time taken to complete each check.
DATA ANALYSIS
Error-detection rates were analysed using a 2 (checklist type;
old vs new)34 (error type; pump programming vs mismatch
vs patient ID vs clinical decision) repeated-measures analysis
of variance (ANOVA) with an a level of 0.05. Differences
between means for each of the four error types were assessed
using post-hoc pairwise comparisons with the Bonferroni
correction. Time to complete the checks was analysed using
a one-way (checklist type; old vs new) repeated-measures
ANOVA with an a of 0.05.
RESULTS
Overall, the new checklist helped nurses to detect more errors
of any type (55%; 71/130) than the old checklist (38%; 49/130)
(F(1,9)¼26.64, p<0.01).
ERROR DETECTION
There was a signiﬁcant interaction between checklist type and
error type (F(3,27)¼7.31, p<0.01) (ﬁgure 5).
Errors in pump programming
There was no signiﬁcant difference in detection of pump
programming errors between the checklists (90% with the old
checklist (51/60); and 80% with the new checklist (48/60))
(p>0.05). We expected that the change in the order of items on
the checklist would improve the rate of error detection by
eliminating conﬁrmation bias, but this was not the case.
Table 1 Failure modes for chemotherapy administered via ambulatory
infusion pumps
Category Failure mode Severity Probability
Pump-programming
error
Nurse enters incorrect
rate when programming pump
Catastrophic Occasional
Nurse enters incorrect volume
when programming pump
Minor Occasional
Nurse enters incorrect lock level
(or forgets to lock) when
programming pump
Minor Occasional
Patient-identiﬁcation
error
Nurse picks up medications
from pharmacy and administers
to wrong patient
Catastrophic Occasional
Mismatch between
drug label and order
Prepared medication does
not match order because
physician has changed order
since pharmacy printed it and
prepared the medication
Moderate Frequent
Prepared medication does
not match order because
pharmacy made error when
transcribing the order into
pharmacy system
Catastrophic Occasional
Clinical decision error Physician orders an inappropriate
prescription, and this is not
detected by subsequent care
providers. Error could be
with any aspect of the
drug order: dose weight
(mg), dose volume (ml),
infusion rate, infusion
volume, etc.
Catastrophic Uncommon
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Error managementErrors in patient identiﬁcation
Detection of identiﬁcation errors with the new checklist (80%;
16/20) was signiﬁcantly higher than with the old checklist (15%;
3/20) (p<0.01). Thus, the addition of the speciﬁc item on the
checklist (ie, ‘check MRN (medical record number) and name
from armband to medication label’) had a positive impact on
error detection.
Mismatches between order and label
Overall, detection of mismatch errors was low, and there was no
signiﬁcant difference between the old checklist (45%; 9/20) and
the new checklist (60%; 12/20) (p>0.05). Since no changes were
made to this error detection task on the checklist, we were not
surprised by this result.
Clinical decision errors
Neither checklist helped nurses to identify clinical errors (none
of these was detected; 0/30). Thus, the addition of the general
reminder to stop and think critically had no impact on error
detection (p>0.05).
Efﬁciency
On average, it took nurses 2:16 (minutes:seconds) to complete
a check with the old checklist and 1:55 with the new checklist.
This 21 s improvement was not statistically signiﬁcant
(p>0.05). Thus, despite the addition of a step for verifying
patient identity that required the nurse to travel to the bedside,
there was no difference in efﬁciency between the two checklists.
Further, nurses commented that the new checklist seemed easier
to use.
DISCUSSION
In this study we aimed to determine which checklist features
impacted nurses’ ability to detect different types of errors in
a double checking process. We found a wide range in error-
detection rates: as few as 0% and as many as 90% of errors were
identiﬁed, depending on the type of error and the checklist used.
SPECIFIC REMINDERS ARE EFFECTIVE BUT NOT FAILSAFE
When the checklist included speciﬁc instructions detailing what
to look for and where to look (such as the pump programming
Figure 1 Checklist for independent
double checking introduced in the
chemotherapy nursing unit (old
checklist).
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Error managementitems on both checklists and the patient identiﬁcation item on
the new checklist), detection rates were much higher (80e90%)
than when the instructions were less speciﬁc. For example, the
items for detecting mismatches between the order and label
simply instructed nurses to check the medication label against
the original order but did not specify which data points to check;
Figure 2 Redesigned checklist for
performing double checks (new
checklist).
Figure 3 Usability laboratory.
Figure 4 Nurse participant interacting with a patient actor as the
confederate nurse interrupts in the simulated outpatient chemotherapy
environment.
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Error managementthe detection rates for this type of error were quite low
(45e60%). The addition of a general reminder to think critically
did not help nurses detect any clinical errors. However, adding
a speciﬁc reminder to check identiﬁcation from the patient’s
armband to the drug label improved error detection by 65
percentage points. Thus, speciﬁc checklist items can help clini-
cians identify well-deﬁned, speciﬁc errors. Although this is an
encouraging ﬁnding, it is important to note that 10e20% of
errors still went undetected when they were accompanied by
speciﬁc instructions, highlighting that human checking
processes are not failsafe.
Mechanistic versus abstract tasks
Todetectmostofthemedicationerrorsinthisstudy,nurseshadto
mechanisticallycomparedatafromonesource(eg,rateinml/hon
a drug label) against data from another source (eg, rate on an
infusion pump in ml/h) to determine if the two matched. In
contrast, detection of clinical decision errors required nurses to
compare data from one tangible source (eg, dosage in mg from
a physician’s order) against their abstract clinical knowledge of
chemotherapy protocols, in the context of a speciﬁc patient, to
determine if all the details of the order were appropriate. Nurses
were much better at detecting errors which required mechanistic
tasks than those which required critical thought. This difference
in performance is consistent with the idea that it is more difﬁcult
to detect strategic mistakes than tactical mistakes and that
execution errors are more easily detected than method errors.
24 25
Further, whereas the use of speciﬁc instructions helped nurses
with mechanistic error-detection tasks, the addition of a general
reminder to think critically and remember the ‘ﬁve rights’ of
medication administration did not help with the abstract task.
Expecting clinicians to mechanistically review several speciﬁc
aspects of medication administration and then to switch to
thinking abstractly about clinical appropriateness may be
unrealistic.
26 If abstract thinking tasks are essential to the ﬁnal
medication administration process, it may be necessary to
separate these from the mechanistic tasks and their associated
checklists, and to develop other strategies for supporting
abstract clinical thought. Further research is needed in this area.
INDEPENDENCE OF DOUBLE CHECKING
Our revised approach to double checking was designed to
encourage nurses to review the pump settings before looking at
the prescription details, thus ensuring ‘independence’ through
the elimination of conﬁrmation bias. We believed this approach
would result in higher error-detection rates, but found no
difference between the old and new checklists in detection of
errors in pump programming.
Upon analysis, we realised that the new design did not in fact
eliminate conﬁrmation bias; instead, conﬁrmation bias was
Table 2 Errors used in laboratory experiment
Error type Explanation Example
Pump-programming
error
First nurse programmed
the pump incorrectly.
Error in rate, volume or
lock level.
Rate has been programmed
as 0.3 ml/h.
The correct rate is 3 ml/h as
shown on order and label.
Patient-identiﬁcation
error
Two patients in the unit
have similar names
and/or identiﬁers.
The wrong patient is in
the bed, or the ﬁrst
nurse picked up
the wrong medication
from pharmacy.
Order and label are for Ross Kelly,
MRN (medical record
number) #7004589. Patient
wristband reads Kelly Ross,
MRN#7004591.
Mismatch between
drug label
and order
Physician changed the
order after pharmacy
prepared the drug,
or pharmacy made a
transcription error. Order
is correct, but
label and prepared
drug are incorrect.
Order shows correct dose of 56 mg.
Medication
label shows 50 mg.
Clinical
decision
error
Physician made error
during order entry which
pharmacist did not detect.
All documentation
elements match, but
they are not clinically
appropriate.
Error could be in dose,
volume or rate.
Physician ordered dose 103 too
high. Order and label show
1000 mg. Correct clinical
value is 100 mg.
Figure 5 Error-detection rates by error type and checklist type.
Table 3 Steps for developing a checklist for detecting errors
Step Task
1 Determine the errors with high risk or high probability that could reach the bedside, using a technique such as failure modes and effects analysis.
18
2 Develop speciﬁc checklist instructions for each predictable error. Include details of what information to check (eg, dose in mg) and from what sources (physician’s order
and drug label). Keep the list short
27 28 by omitting items with lower risk and lower probability.
3 If the possibility of an error is abstract or general (eg, error in physician’s dosage choice), but the error itself has a high severity or probability, break the error down into
smaller, more speciﬁc steps that can be added to the instructions (eg, check dosage on medication order against hospital drug formulary of appropriate adult doses).
4 Determine the workﬂow of the ﬁrst and second nurses by observing them working in their natural environment using a technique such as contextual enquiry.
21 22
5 To encourage efﬁciency and adoption, assemble the itemised instructions into a checklist that corresponds with their workﬂow, and use language and terms that match
their existing tools such as the infusion pump screen prompts.
6 To test and improve the usability of the checklist, recruit a small sample of end users (three to six people) to use the checklist while you observe. If they become
confused, use the checklist in a way that is not anticipated, or readily miss errors, reﬁne the design of the form to be more intuitive, and repeat the testing process.
7 For each potential error not included on the checklist, develop alternate strategies to prevent it from reaching the bedside. Continue to develop additional strategies for
eliminating all possible errors, even those that can be identiﬁed with the checklist, since no human checking process is failsafe.
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Error managementshifted from the point of checking the pump to the point of
checking the newly completed checklist against the prescription
details. Hence, the nurses might still have seen what they
expected to see on the order when they veriﬁed the (sometimes
incorrect) values from the checklist against the prescription.
More research is needed to determine how to reduce or eliminate
conﬁrmation bias from a human veriﬁcation process.
For double checking processes, we feel that the most impor-
tant factor is the completion, by a second individual, of a well-
designed, easy-to-use checklist with a speciﬁc item for each
speciﬁc high-risk error.
DEVELOPING A CHECKLIST FOR DETECTING ERRORS
On the basis of our ﬁndings, we recommend the following steps
when developing a checklist for detecting errors (table 3).
Study limitations
The clinical focus of this research was the detection by nurses of
errors related to administration of chemotherapy and did not
include other clinical areas. However, we anticipate that our
ﬁndings and recommendations will be applicable to any context
where a care provider must perform a series of mechanistic tasks
under a high cognitive load.
For ethical reasons, we were not able to conduct this
controlled experiment of error detection in a live clinical envi-
ronment. Due to the short-term nature of the simulation, we
could not determine the long-term effect of the new checklist on
nurses’ behaviour. Further, participants had been using the ‘old’
checklist in their unit for some time. We had expected nurses
would detect more errors with the old checklist as a result of
their familiarity with it, but this was not the case. Another
limitation was that interruptions were not scripted but instead
ﬂowed naturally from the actors to create a sense of realism, and
therefore were more subject to random error than with a script.
CONCLUSIONS
This research has highlighted that checklists incorporating
speciﬁc step-by-step instructions are useful for detecting certain
errors. Although technological systems can achieve a much
higher accuracy and reliability than any human processes, fully
integrated and automated systems for complex healthcare are
not likely to exist in the near future, and we question whether
this goal is ultimately achievable. As such, checklists remain
a necessary safety tool for clinicians performing long series of
mechanistic tasks and must be designed to support this activity.
However, further research is needed to determine how best to
assist clinicians in switching between mechanistic tasks and
abstract problem solving.
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